Sunday,
March 5, 2006
Vol. III No. 4 |
Sunday,
March 5, 2006
Vol. III No. 4 |
Welcome
to the
Over the
Airwaves
aviation journal. This complimentary bi-weekly e-mailing
is being sent to pilots and aviation enthusiasts around the
world. Its aim
is to promote
flight safety, encourage students and new pilots, and to build
enthusiasm for aviation in general.
Dear Pilots and Aviation Enthusiasts:
When I went off to war as a young lieutenant (back in what my 16 year old daughter calls the "black and white" days), the U.S. Army had spent four years teaching me the rules of engagement as prescribed in part by the Geneva Convention. These and similar rules had been developed and refined following every war since the our Revolution of 1776. Our military leaders told us to play by the rules lest we die on the battlefield.
We lost that war and the lives of over 50,000 brave American men and women. Guess what? We changed the rules again and set out to remove an evil dictator from Iraq. Our soldiers were taught these new rules. Easy victory was promised. Well . . . Winning the war of general aviation accidents! Anybody who received a private pilot's certificate in the past 30 years knows that we have rules to fly by. Many of these rules were crafted following the end of WWII. Federal agencies from the Civil Aeronautics Agency (CAA), to the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) each massaged and tweaked these rules with the same good intention that our War Department and later the Department of Defense tweaked the rules of engagement. Guess what? We in the general aviation community are not winning that war, either! Just like today's military rules of engagement, some of those carefully crafted, massaged, and tweaked aviation rules may not provide the answer we're looking for when the going gets tough!
All of us within the flight training community are strong proponents of obeying the rules . . . even though some may have questionable practical value in today's highly sophisticated national airspace system. FAR 61.57 (instrument currency requirements) and FAR 91.185 (failed radios in IFR conditions) are classic examples. The same rules forbid flight into known icing in non-known ice certified airplanes . . . yet it took numerous court battles to define what known ice really is! How about FAR 91.103. Must pilots with glass cockpits (CMAX) have paper approach plates and low altitude enroute charts on board? Here's one to think about: Are you making aircraft logbook entries each time you replace your GPS data cards? You are required to do this per FAR Part 43 and FAR 91.407(a)(2)! These and several other rules have questionable utility or are in need of updating, yet they are still on the books. Some, in fact, could lead a regulation-compliant pilot into a bad outcome. The camel's nose in the tent door!
The truth of the matter is that the aviation world is changing faster than the rule makers can keep up. September 11, alone, proved that! Near universal radar coverage has also changed the way we maintain aircraft separation. The emergence of TAA (technically advanced aircraft) has reduced our dependence upon "steam gauges" that were our mainstay for over 100 years. Perhaps the greatest difference between regulations and reality occurs in the area of pilot qualification and currency requirements for both VFR and IFR flight. Remember, 75.9% of all GA accidents are attributed to pilot error! That's the war we're losing, by the way. Given the lessons learned by our military leaders over the past couple of wars, perhaps it would be best that, instead of building pilot dependence upon a set of rules and regulations, we build a keener understanding of the system itself. For example, FAR 91.123 requires that pilots comply with all ATC clearances. That's fine, but perhaps it would be better if we pilots understand the possible consequences of not complying with an ATC clearance. You know, like bent metal! The same is true with the rules pertaining to pilot qualification and currency requirements. Compliance is one thing. Understanding the requirements for safe flight is quite another. Here alone, the gap between compliance and understanding is enormous!! Maybe we should have just one all encompassing rule like, "Pilots shall not do anything stupid." The question is, "How do we teach it?" We teach it with the understanding that pilots, student pilots included, are not children. Pilots are adults. As adults, we use our heads, not just our memories. We learn to assess risks, select appropriate behaviors, then move on. When done properly, fewer rules will be violated and less accidents will occur. The entire system will become safer. As for the rules? Sure, they must be followed until altered or changed. But we must never leave judgment at the doorstep in the name of following all of the rules. To some, it may seem like a simple little flight training exercise. To others, it can be a handful! The drill involves picking a safe target altitude just 300 or 400 feet below your cruise altitude. While in cruise, reduce power and configure your airplane for "landing" on that target altitude. Your goal is to descend no faster than 100 feet per minute, maintain your heading +/- two degrees, and to be traveling no more than five knots above stall speed when you reach that altitude. Then maintain that altitude, heading, and airspeed for 15 seconds. If you bust through this target altitude, even by 10 feet, you "fail" the maneuver! Continue this exercise by selecting repeated lower target altitudes. Be sure to have a safety pilot with you to watch for other traffic as you practice this maneuver.
Descending and leveling off at a precise altitude is not difficult. But doing it strictly within the performance parameters noted above is difficult. In the early phases of their training, it takes most of my primary flight students at least one hour of steady practice before they can perform this maneuver satisfactorily. But once they can, learning to land becomes a snap for them! Practicing over the runway . . . Next, repeat this exercise directly over the runway. But instead of touching down, the pilot is told to "hover taxi" the airplane no more that three feet above all but that last 1,500 feet of the entire runway surface. The longer the runway, the more effective the exercise! This phase of the exercise sharpens the pilot's visual scan. He or she is not only looking at the airspeed indicator, he's looking out the windows, both front and side. He learns to quickly assess his landing environment. By looking out his side window he is able to remain properly aligned with the runway edge. He discovers that the high, nose up attitude that normally prevents his front view of the runway at flare can be solved by looking out to his side. Kissing the runway . . . The next element of this fun exercise is to allow the wheels to repeatedly "kiss" the runway. This involves a series of power offs, flare, "kiss the runway," power up, climb 30 feet, power off, flare, "kiss" the runway, etc. for all but the last 1,500 feet of runway. If you think this is easy, remember that my students learn to perform this maneuver satisfactorily within the first six or seven hours of their flight training! They quickly and easily develop a keen awareness of controlling pitch and power to achieve a perfect landing every time. The grand finale!
This is a common tailwheel exercise that is easily performed with tricycle gear airplanes. Learning to alternatively touch and go on the left then right wheels develops mastery of the landing process! Pilots should never regard their landings as either good or bad. Once they master this exercise, EVERY landing will be good . . . even in gusty crosswinds!
Those of you who are wrestling
with the intricacies of the latest in general
aviation glass panel technology will want to
rush out and purchase the G1000 Glass
Cockpit Handbook, authored by Master
Certificated Flight Inst Until now, there’s been no
single source of information that educates
pilots about all of the features and benefits of
flying the G1000, and how features vary between
aircraft manufacturers. Whether you fly
Beechcraft, Cessna, Columbia, Diamond, Mooney or
Tiger aircraft, you’ll learn which G1000
features apply to your particular aircraft. Click HERE for ordering information.
The "go around" is a maneuver that everybody should be spring-loaded to perform, but tragically, catches many pilots off-guard and unprepared! As simple as may appear to be, the "go around" requires a decisive series of steps performed in the proper order: (1) power; (2) pitch; (3) positive climb; (4) flaps retract; (5) gear up; (6) Vy climb. If only it were so easy! Contrary to what may be perceived as a simple transition from landing to takeoff, the "go around" maneuver is replete with pitfalls. The landing airplane is slow and dirty (flaps and gear are down) likely with considerable nose up trim dialed in. The sudden addition of "go around" power creates considerable nose up pressure on the yoke. A premature flap retraction can cause the airplane to settle back down to the runway. If the gear was retracted along with the flaps, this settling could cause an inadvertent gear-up landing. Strong left turning tendencies (P-factor, torque, gyroscopic, and slipstream forces) on the climb out could cause a dangerous yawing effect which, in the presence of a possible departure stall, could precipitate a stall/spin accident. "Go around" with a Side-Step Maneuver Keeping in mind that many "go arounds" are caused by another aircraft on the ground either taking or remaining too long on the active runway, executing a side-step maneuver along with the "go around" may be advisable. Side-stepping slightly to the right on the "go around" enables the pilot to keep his eye on the errant aircraft on the runway.
The timely execution of a "go around" is one the most effective safety tools in the pilot's bag of maneuvers. It should be used anytime that a safe landing cannot be guaranteed.
It is tough to imagine how two professional pilots, one with over 10,000 hours, could come to a tragic end on a straight-forward, standard localizer approach . . . but they did.
The accident occurred on October 24, 2004 while on the localizer runway 30 approach to Martinsville/Blue Ridge Airport (MTV), Martinsville, Virginia. The two pilots flying a Beach King Air 200 had been cleared to fly the full procedure as published. They crossed the initial approach fix (BALES) outbound at 4,000' as instructed by ATC. They turned inbound and once established, ATC instructed them to switch to the advisory frequency. They continued inbound and crossed the final approach fix (also BALES) at 3,900' instead of descending to 2,600' as published on the approach plate (see below).
The accident chain begins! According to the approach procedure, the airplane was supposed to be at 2,600' when crossing the FAF inbound. They were at 3,900' and they continued at that altitude for another two miles inside the FAF before beginning their descent! The controller noticed that they were very high on the approach but could not reach the crew because they had already switched over to the airport advisory frequency. The airplane leveled off at 2,600' as it passed the missed approach point (MAP). Then, about one mile after passing MAP and over the runway, the airplane began a descent to 1,400'. It leveled at 1,400' about 4 nm beyond the airport and 5 nm beyond the MAP. According to the NTSB report, when the airplane was 2.5 nm northwest of the airport and at an altitude of 1,800 feet, the controller’s computer system generated a minimum safe altitude warning (MSAW) alert that lasted for 15 seconds. MSAW provides visual and aural alerts to controllers if a mode C-equipped aircraft is, or is projected to be, below an appropriate terrain clearance altitude. A review of the radar data indicated that an MSAW alert had sounded and was visually displayed on the controller’s radar display as a flashing “LA” (low altitude) in the data block for the accident airplane. The controller stated that he did not observe or hear the MSAW alert. The airplane maintained level flight between 1,400 and 1,500 feet for about 8 nm beyond airport, then it initiated a straight-ahead climb. The flight crew informed the controller, “we’re going missed at this time.” The controller asked the flight crew to repeat the radio transmission. The flight crew repeated the information, and the controller acknowledged the radio transmission. The controller received no further radio transmissions from the flight crew. The accident occurred on Bull Mountain in Stuart, Virginia, at an elevation of about 2,400' and near the extended centerline of the runway. A trooper with the Virginia State Police stated that, at the time of the accident and throughout the search and recovery efforts (which spanned throughout the day and evening), Bull Mountain was completely obscured by clouds and fog. The trooper stated that the visibility was between 0 and 0.25 mile. A profile view of the accident airplane's descent profile is shown below:
Note that the actual flight path roughly paralleled the required descent profile published on the approach procedure, except that it was about 7nm late throughout! What went wrong? Both crew members were experienced, well-trained and current as seen below:
As the NTSB report indicated, there was no cockpit voice recorder (CVR) or flight data recorder (FDR) and we certainly do not know what was going through the pilots' minds. But, at the NTSB report infers, it appears as if the pilots were deriving their distance to fly information from the GPS. As they approached and passed over the final approach fix (BALES), they failed to notice that the GPS dispaly had autosequenced to the next way point, the airport (MTV). If this was the case, the pilots assumed that they had another 5.2 miles to go before reaching BALES! Another problem: The accident airplane was equipped with a working ADF (automatic direction finder) capable of tuning in the the LOM/FAF (locator outer marker). If tuned in properly and monitored, the pilots would have observed the ADF needle swing as they passed over the LOM. Similarly, if turned on, the marker beacon light would have shined as they passed over the LOM. And the final problem: The published missed approach procedure called for a climbing right turn at the missed approach point (MAP), which is over the runway threshold. Radar data indicated that the flight crew initiated the missed approach 7.5 nm beyond the MAP. Instead of making a climbing right turn at what they misperceived was the MAP, the accident airplane then entered a straight-ahead climb on the runway heading. The graphic below (taken from the NTSB report) compares the airplane's actual flightpath (in blue) with would would have resulted if the airplane had entered a standard-rate right turn during the climb (in red). Even though well beyond the MAP, had they followed the published missed approach procedure, the accident could have been prevented.
Below is the NTSB's probable cause statement:
Lessons to be learned from this accident . . .
What went wrong???? Pretty perplexing, huh! Two well qualified, current pilots flying a properly maintained and functioning airplane along a typical, uncomplicated localizer approach with good ATC radar coverage down to about 1,000' AGL. There was no icing, no turbulence, just mist and fog. No emergency was declared, no abnormal cockpit/ATC communications . . . nothing to indicate a problem. Yet they augered into the side of a mountain and died. What went wrong? Here, in part, is what the NTSB accident analysis report had to say:
Editor's Note: Here is where publications such as "Over the Airwaves" offers their greatest value to readers. Just because we pilots believe ourselves to be well-trained, current, and proficient and because we fly safe airplanes, we believe ourselves to be immune from accidents and do not need to review publications such as this. Truth is, we're all human and unless we continually address our human frailties, accidents happen. Systematic recurrent training and daily learning from the mistakes of others are effective ways to address these frailties.
Few things are as discourteous to other pilots approaching a non-towered field than to have the guy in front of him call and turn from the downwind to the base leg two to three miles or more from the runway! This hapless pilot delays his base turn for several possible reasons. First, he fails to compensate for high winds that "push" him further from the airport. Second, he may simply want to create a nice long final approach let to get stabilized for landing. So what's the problem with LARGE traffic patterns? The number one problem is RISK! The larger the traffic pattern, the more difficult it becomes to see and avoid other landing aircraft. The number two problem is increased arrival and departure DELAYs. Much of this problem is created by student pilots trained at large, tower controlled airports where traffic pattern turns are called by tower controllers accustomed to separating and sequencing airliners. Here, long downwind leg turns are occasionally called by tower controllers to accommodate straight in arrivals by larger jet traffic.
For the tower controlled airport trained pilots, the visual image of this excessively large traffic pattern often becomes engrained in the brain. When operating at non-tower controlled airports, some such pilots find it either difficult or uncomfortable to keep their patterns tight. So when should you turn on to your base leg? The only distance guidance given to us by the Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM 4.3.3) is by example. Here, it says to "complete turn to final at least 1/4 mile from the runway." Remember, 1/4 mile is only 1,500 feet! As a guide, most properly trained pilots will commence their base turn just as soon as the runway threshold appears just behind their wing. Appropriate wind adjustments should be made (see illustration above).
Stephen, a friend and avid OTA reader, is a rare and charismatic inspirational speaker who routinely holds audiences spellbound with the humorous and inspiring story of his life as a spiritual being having a human experience. Achieving his instrument rating this past month is just another in Stephen's many remarkable accomplishments. Click HERE for details on Stephen's instrument flight training experience! If you are looking for an inspirational speaker for your next event, contact Mr. Hopson at sjhopson@yahoo.com.
Recall our radio failure in IMC scenario described in the previous issue of "Over the Airwaves?" Sally had departed the Richmond, Virginia airport and climbed up into IFR weather conditions enroute, via the northeast corridor, to Martha's Vineyard, MA. Shortly after entering IFR conditions, Sally lost two-way communications. At that moment in time, Sally found herself intellectually torn. Should she obey the provisions of FAR 91.185 (two-way radio failure in IMC) and proceed along her last assigned route, altitude, etc. for several more hours, sans radios, through the busiest airspace in the world? There are no provisions in FAR 91.185 that permitted any other choice. Or, should she violate FAR 91.123 and AIM 6.1.1.c and depart from her ATC issued clearance and bolt for VFR conditions immediately below? Remember, no real emergency existed at this point. Sally had simply lost two-way radio communications. Sally was caught between the proverbial rock and a hard place. On the one hand, she had been taught, like all of us, to follow the regulations. FAR 91.185 is quite specific about what to do in the event of lost two-way communication in IFR conditions. AIM 6.1.1.c makes in clear that failed two-way radios by themselves do not constitute an emergency. Airplanes fly perfectly well without two-way radios. No wiggle room there! What should Sally have done? What would you have done? Inquiring pilots want to know! Sally is a good pilot, very well trained by the Blind Obedience Flight School. She knew the regulations and she certainly wasn't about to violate them. Except this time she was in doubt. The regulations do not make special allowances for the type of airspace within which one is operating. They make no mention of national security issues in this context. Just so that we're all reading from the same page on this question, take a minute to review below FAR 91.185. Do you see any wiggle room there?
Now, take a minute and review FAR 91.123 below. Do you see any wiggle room there?
Don't be too quick to jump to the pilots' emergency authority! Two-way radio failure in IFR conditions, absent any other factors, may not be viewed by the FAA as a legitimate emergency. It is possible in Sally's scenario that there was a loose wire in her push-to-talk button. Using a hand mike or simply plugging into the co-pilot headset jacks may have solved her problem. Let's say, however, that she couldn't solve here two-way radio failure problem. Does an emergency condition thus exist?? Take a look below at what the Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM) has to say about that. Note, particularly, sub-paragraph c and the reference it cites, e.g., FAR 91.185!
See any wiggle room in sub-paragraph c? It tells us straight out that if a two-way radio failure occurs on IFR flights, absent any other emergency conditions covered under FAR 91.3, follow the FAR 91.185 rules! Back to Sally's flight. In the scenario as described, did Sally have any basis other than her two-way radio failure to declare an emergency??? If not, would she then be required to slog her way up the busy east coast, through the Washington, DC ADIZ, Baltimore, Philadelphia, Newark, New York, and Boston airspace for three or more hours, without two-way radios, enroute to her destination to Martha's Vineyard? Sally's scenario as described did allude to the possibility of an alternator failure that would have rendered her without electrics and an inability to navigate. Certainly that would have constituted a genuine emergency. But again, per the scenario, she did not know if that was the problem. All she knew was that she had lost two-way communications. Thus, Sally had two options:
What YOU said Sally should do! Recall in the previous issue I asked you to select either option A. or B. as depicted below.
All but one of the over 100 responses received selected "B". Were you right??? Let's say that Sally followed the majority recommendation and descended back down into VFR conditions and landed. Next, let's say that the FAA got involved in this matter and requested that Sally complete a report. In this report, the FAA demands that Sally obtain a statement from a certified repair station regarding the reason for her radio failure and other factors justifying her emergency declaration. Herein lies the key to Sally's guilt or innocence! Had the radios failed due to an alternator failure or other electrical system failure (which can be proven), my guess is that Sally is off the hook under her emergency authority. If, on the other hand, the only problem Sally encountered was a short in her headset or a simple audio panel problem, Sally better get a good aviation attorney! Had Sally's decision to immediately descend immediately without a clearance caused a loss of separation with another aircraft, or worse, she (or her estate) had better hire a very, very good attorney! There is a bigger lesson here! The bigger question is not whether or not Sally violated the regulations, but whether or not Sally, and possibly others in the airspace with her, survived the event. The answer to this question depends upon Sally's aeronautical decision making and risk management assessment skills. Did Sally, in fact, do the right thing irrespective of the FAR/AIM? If she got on the ground and did not cause an accident in the process, it could be said that she did the right thing from a flight safety perspective, but she still broke the rules! If, on the other hand, her actions caused a loss of separation with another aircraft (or worse), she did the wrong thing safety wise and she still broke the rules!
What would I have done in Sally's scenario? What would I have done? I ALWAYS fly with a fully charged handheld radio and GPS with terrain avoidance (Garmin 296) so I would have not likely ever encountered Sally's scenario. Sorry, that's a cop-out! In Sally's scenario just as it was described, I would have immediately squawked 7600. Next, I would have trouble-shot my electrical system. By this time I would be confident that ATC was well aware of my two-way communications failure and was tracking my every move. If my electrical system was still functioning properly per the amp/volt meter, I'd begin to trouble-shoot the radios. Was I hearing but could not transmit. Could I transmit but not hear? Could I squawk "ident" in response to ATC's questions? Perhaps ATC might offer me options via a yes/no series of questions. Hand mike work? Could I be heard on 121.5? Okay, let's say everything appeared to be working okay except my two-way radios. Did I have a valid reason to assume that an emergency existed? Depends! In a glass cockpit aircraft where EVERYTHING depends upon electricity, I'd be watching for the first sign of an electrical burp. Once that appeared, it would be an emergency, no question! In a conventional cockpit set up, I could suffer along without electricity. Unfortunately, this would leave me without backdoors. By this time, ATC has definitely cleared all traffic away from my immediate path including up and down. This leaves me to deal with terrain avoidance in the event I elect to bolt back down to VFR per option "B" in the scenario. In my Cessna 210, I have two very good radios (Garmin 430's) and only one alternator. If I mysteriously lost two-way communications which I could not trouble-shoot away, I would assume a serious problem existed and would consider it a genuine emergency. Once assured in my mind that ATC was aware of my plight and has had time to clear traffic below, I would descend back to VFR and land. And in summary . . . Sally's scenario very clearly points to the fact that the FAR/AIM contains rules and regulations that may not fit every in-flight scenario. Attempting to comply with every FAR in every given situation is, frankly, a fool's folly. While there is an ample supply of flight instructors who will vigorously argue this point, the shear volume of aviation court cases easily refutes this point. Adherents to the "Blind Obedience School of Flight Training" argue that if one disallows the validity of one FAR in a given scenario, where do you draw the line? Which other FARs will we disallow as well? Very good point. I do not know the answer to that question. But we do know this. The pilot in command (PIC) is responsible for the safe outcome of every flight. That PIC must always endeavor to adhere to all applicable FARs in the conduct of that flight. He or she is required to exercise proper aeronautical decision making and risk management assessment skills. If, in the PIC's judgment, the safety of his flight requires a deviation from those regulations, he should be free to initiate that deviation. Quite naturally, however, later on the ground he may be called upon by the FAA to justify such deviation(s) . . . and be prepared to accept the consequences if his decision, in the eyes of the FAA, was incorrect. In the final analysis, you could either be DEAD right or safely WRONG. This is what aeronautical decision making and risk management assessment is all about.
The 4,000 hour pilot was attempting to fly within sight of the semi truck being driven by the aircraft's co-owner on I-81, near Waynesboro, VA. A witness told police the plane circled at treetop level three times before going down. The NTSB has not determined a definite cause or contributing factors in the accident. FAA investigators found no evidence of any pre-impact malfunctions. Curiously, there is no FAA prohibition against using cell phones when operating in VFR conditions (though the FCC may have something to say about it).
As is often customary in such online chat forums, several members elected to critically dissect this article, then promulgate a debate. Before long, other members joined in on both sides of this debate. It was not long before proverbial lines in the sand were drawn with several forum members vigorously claiming that this article revealed that I had violated several FARs, that I exhibited a cavalier approach to conducting unusual attitude training in IMC, and that I set an unacceptable example for other pilots. Based upon this article, it was clear to these forum critics that I should be defrocked as a flight instructor, a Master Instructor at that, and that I should be banished to Siberia as an aeronautical heretic. Not content to merely debate the issue on this forum, these critical members chose to communicate their criticisms to the National Association of Flight Instructors (NAFI)! You can imagine the reaction NAFI, who confers my Master Instructor accreditation, when these readers inundated this professional organization with a tidal wave of their mis-directed criticisms. NAFI immediately referred this matter to its Professional Standards Committee for study. After careful consideration, the NAFI Professional Standards Committee, without discussing the matter with me, sent me a certified letter containing a suggested solution to the matter. This solution required that I post on my web site a "critical self-analysis/clarification of [my] statements and the training scenarios that led to those statements." Given the flight safety implications of the training scenarios I described and the likelihood that perhaps I really had left serious reader misconceptions I, of course, set out to clarify each of the criticisms raised by the critical AOPA online forum members. Curiously, while this ugly debate was underway on the AOPA online forum, I was receiving numerous compliments on the article from my "Over the Airwaves" subscribers as well as from other online forum members including COPA (Cirrus Owners and Pilots Association)! The criticisms levied by my AOPA forum critics and my responses are shown below: Criticism 1 - Taking off with inoperative components: Forum critics somehow concluded from their reading of this article that I knowingly and willfully took off with inoperative aircraft components as evidenced by the existence of glowing dual alternator annunciator lights. A quick reference to the following extract of this article demonstrates that this criticism is without merit: "The flickering went away during the run-up and remained off during the takeoff roll. Everything was going along fine. No annunciator lights were shining, so we picked up our IFR clearance airborne and climbed up into the clouds." How these critics missed this clearly written statement in their reading of the article escapes me! Criticism 2 - Conducting training in known icing conditions in a non-known ice certified airplane: The portion of the article critics are referring to pertains to our approach to the Elmira Airport and our subsequent missed approach and climb out to the west. They referred specifically to the following text: "We encountered light icing just as I was restoring the PFD and MFD." They also referred to this statement: "Some 20 miles east of Jamestown we, again, encountered icing conditions. Mark requested and received clearance to climb to clear air at 8,000' MSL." Forum critics concluded from their reading of this article that I deliberately flew this non-known ice certified into KNOWN icing conditions. What the article failed to describe was that both icing layers we passed through were actually thin broken clouds with clear skies immediately above and warmer air and good visible ground contact immediately below. We easily escaped these icing conditions before any accumulation occurred. There were no icing AIRMETs nor pilot reports of icing covering these areas. Forum critics insisted that entry into ANY clouds with outside air temperatures below freezing, whether or not icing exists or is reported or forecasted to exist, is a violation of our aircraft's certification limits. This is simply not true! For known ice to exist per the regulations, it must be either reported or forecasted. Forum critics also failed to note my rational for executing a missed approach at Elmira and continuing our training flight to the west as revealed in the following text from the article: "A quick check with Flight Watch confirmed better weather conditions to the west and no reports of icing in that direction, so we proceeded 66 miles west to the Olean, NY airport (KOLE)." Granted, this matter of flight into what critics claimed as known ice, based upon my less than complete explanation, is plausible. Having failed to adequately describe the actual flight conditions quite reasonably led readers to believe (wrongly) that I deliberately entered known icing conditions in a non known ice certified aircraft. This, in truth, was not the fact. Criticism 3 - Cavalier approach to conducting unusual attitude training in IMC The portion of the article these forum critics apparently objected to is quoted as follows: "Still in the clouds, I disabled the MFD (multi-function display shown on the right in photo below) and the PFD (primary flight display shown on the left in the photo below). This left Mark with only the Garmin 430's and the emergency three instruments (airspeed, heading indicator, and altimeter)." What I failed to adequately explain in the article is that I did NOT actually "disable" the displays by turning them off. Instead, I simply dimmed their background lights. This left my student with the very same conventional gauges present on any non-glass panel aircraft, e.g., altimeter, attitude indicator, airspeed indicator, plus the moving map displays on both Garmin 430s. There is nothing hazardous about partial panel training in glass cockpits, even in IMC, if the pilot has working conventional gauges. Curiously, there was nothing mentioned in the article about unusual attitudes! I have no clue how the forum critics came up with this complaint! Criticism 4 - My writings set an unacceptable example for other pilots. Had these forum critics' accusations been true, I would surely agree that such behavior would have set an unacceptable example for other pilots. Regretfully, I failed to explain or to describe all of the flight parameters associated with these actual training scenarios. Similarly, I fell victim to the fact that the written word may not always portray an author's intent accurately and that the written word, without benefit of facial expressions and voice intonations, can be open to misinterpretation. Please note that it was never my intention to place students in a potentially unsafe learning environment or to disregard Federal Aviation Regulations and best training practices. To do so would be contrary to everything I have written in "Over the Airwaves" over the past several years! So there you have it. The "Training Prevents Possible Tragedy" article set out to describe an actual training scenario and a subsequent real in-flight emergency. Unfortunately, my less than perfect and incomplete recounting of these events provided fuel for a lively online chat group debate. Here comes the rub! As mentioned above, NAFI's solution required that I prepare this response for posting in "Over the Airwaves." The rub came when they also required that I first send them this response in draft form for their "review and approval" prior to posting. NAFI also made it clear that it did not wish to receive any more calls or e-mails relative to any future "Over the Airwaves" articles. Hmmmm . . . I certainly recognized the importance of posting a clarifying explanation of any misunderstandings l left with the original article. This I have done. I did, however, object to the requirement of having to obtain NAFI's "approval" of this explanation prior to posting in "Over the Airwaves." Similarly, NAFI's insistence that I cause NO more calls or e-mails to them relative to future OTA articles, regardless of their validity or merit, was not only objectionable, it was also a requirement that I had no control over! As my readers know, I am often critical of the less then stellar flight training being delivered throughout the United States. Similarly, I frequently take a strong stand against the status quo throughout the general aviation industry. Such editorial stands quite naturally cause discomfort to proponents of the "business as usual" mentality. Thus, the only way to eliminate calls and emails going to NAFI relative to OTA articles, regardless of their merit, would be to simply stop advocating change and improved flight safety! NAFI was placing me in a very difficult position! On the one hand, my NAFI-issued accreditation as a Master certificated flight instructor holds me professionally accountable to NAFI, including what I write in "Over the Airwaves." On the other hand, I cherish my First Amendment right of free speech. Decision time! I had to make a choice. One option was to become an obedient NAFI foot soldier and write so as not to precipitate calls or emails to NAFI HQ regarding any "Over the Airwaves" articles. The other option was to simply relinquish my Master Instructor certification and NAFI membership and thereby no longer be subject to NAFI's editorial influence and professional oversight. The choice was simple! I certainly harbor no ill feelings towards NAFI. As a professional organization, they represent the interests of all their member flight instructors, both good and bad, strong and weak. Surely one such as I, especially as a NAFI accredited Master Instructor, who openly criticizes much of what we do in the name of flight instruction, is a proverbial pain in their six o'clock. They offered me a choice and I took what I believed to be the honorable one. I recognize the responsibility I have as the author of a flight training publication that circulates to thousands of pilots around the world. I take this responsibility very seriously. As you know, I receive no compensation from this effort. My aims are purely to enhance and encourage optimal flight safety. As an independent flight instructor, I serve at the pleasure of the FAA, not NAFI nor any other non-governmental aviation organization. If the FAA has issues with any aspect of "Over the Airwaves" or my behavior as a certificated flight instructor, they have every right and responsibility to address those aspects with me directly. Ordinarily, I would not have subjected my OTA readers to this matter but since the issue of flight safety was raised I felt it was important for all to know. If these events cause you to question my competence, judgment, or integrity as a certificated flight instructor or the educational merits of "Over the Airwaves," please advise and I will remove your name from the subscription list. More importantly, if you find fault with any aspect of "Over the Airwaves," please feel free to contact me directly at rjma@rjma.com. This strikes me as a far more appropriate way to approach the matter. In this regard, the editorial content and opinions expressed in "Over the Airwaves" have always been my own. They do not, nor have they ever, reflect or imply the endorsement of NAFI or any other organization or individual. In closing this analysis, I would like to thank OTA reader, Dan Dalpra, owner of the Italian Fisherman, a delightful restaurant located at Bemis Point on Chautauqua Lake, NY for passing along to me, in an unrelated e-mail, the following quote: "If you limit your actions in life to things that nobody can possibly find fault with, you will not do much."
The indicators of bad flight instruction are all around us. Industry experts tell us that as many as two out of every three new flight student starts never succeed in obtaining their private pilots' certificate. AOPA's Air Safety Foundation 2004 Nall Report observes that 75.9% of all GA accidents are attributable to pilot factors (read: pilot error). If the airlines experienced 350 fatal crashes every year as does general aviation, we would all still be traveling by train! How does general aviation compare with corporate and airline safety records?
Source: 2004 Nall Report and Professional Pilot (April, 2005) When you compare the fatal accident rates by type of flying, you will quickly observe that corporate flying has 3 times the fatal accident rate as the airlines. Tragically, you will note that general aviation has nearly 30 times the fatal accident rate of corporate flying and a whopping 100 times the fatal accident rate of the airlines! And remember, 75.9% of all GA accidents are attributed to pilot error. Is there something seriously wrong with primary and advanced flight training? You be the judge! Let's be fair here . . . As the 2004 Nall Report points out, we general aviation pilots do not have all of the inherent safety advantages as corporate operators or the airlines. GA pilots conduct a wider range of operations. Some of us engage in risky endeavors including crop dusting and banner towing. We often operate on unimproved airports, most of which lack precision instrument approaches. There is a large variability of pilot certificate and experience levels. All airline flights, for example, are crewed by at least one ATP (Airline Transport Pilot), the most demanding rating. GA is the training ground for most pilots, and while the GA community has its share of ATPs, the community also includes many new and low time pilots, and a great variety of experience in between. Similarly, GA operations are predominantly conducted by a single pilot, and the pilot typically handles all aspects of the flight, from flight planning to piloting. Air carrier operations require at least two pilots. Likewise, airlines have dispatchers, mechanics, loadmasters, and others to assist with operations. If general aviation is inherently more risky than airline flying, why do we train to a much lower standard?
Curiously, these anemic training requirements and associated standards were dramatically reduced even further for the recreational and light sport pilot! Compare this to airline pilots who undergo rigorous, multi-day, recurrent training every 6 and 12 months. Reality Check There are dozens of reasons why we GA pilots have less stringent training standards. The biggest reason is the economic and political importance to the general aviation industry of maintaining a large population of (member/voting/purchasing) pilots. Any additional FAA mandated and/or heightened competency standards placed on general aviation pilots that have the potential of reducing GA pilot numbers raises loud objections from GA industry organizations and many GA pilots themselves! Yes, having large numbers of member/voting/purchasing GA pilots is necessary to effectively protect the aviating freedoms we enjoy. But a delicate balance exists between pilot numbers and pilot proficiency! We cannot afford to build our numbers by lowering our safety standards. Fortunately for GA pilots, the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) walks this delicate line very skillfully. But the problem is far from solved.
Is your reason for flying to support the economic and political interests of the general aviation industry? Or is it to remain safe while pursuing your flying interests? If it is the latter, then more comprehensive initial and recurrent flight training makes good sense. If you do not wish to expose you, your family, and your friends to fatal flight risks that are 100 times greater than an airline flight, then you must begin to train like an airline pilot! Where to begin?
Don't settle for just any CFI. Look for CFIs with with documented "in the system" experience. Many CFIs acquired their teaching certificates immediately following the completion of their private, instrument, and commercial ratings without ever having experienced any real world, in the system, flying. They can teach to the PTS. Beyond that, many lack the real world wisdom and experience that could save your life when the chips are down. Next, check references. Ask for the names and telephone numbers of the previous four or five students your CFI candidates trained. If they will not give you this information, continue your CFI search. Call each student reference. Ask how well they were prepared for real world flying. Create a recurrent training plan . . . and stick to it!
Since weather factors are the number one cause of GA accidents, be sure to include real weather flying in your annual training program. Don't wait until clear skies and calm winds to do your training. Find an instructor who will launch into stiff crosswinds, who will climb through marginal VFR conditions, who will bring you into the clouds, who will put you into a spin, and who will create challenging training scenarios that cause you to (pardon me) sweat. Your goal . . . increase your safe operating envelope! Next, supplement your in-flight training with simulator work. Go to your local flight school or load up Microsoft Flight Simulator on your home computer. These devices are great for practicing instrument procedures.
Lastly, go out and fly . . . often! Get into the system every week, not only in the CAVU conditions, but when the winds are up, when the visibility is less than perfect, and when there is snow on the runway. Exercise your skills regularly and you will remain proficient! Flying skills are like airplane engines. The more frequently they are put to work, the better off you will be. Embrace portable technology Portable GPS with built in terrain avoidance and weather offers the GA pilot much of the same in-flight navigation and weather avoidance capability as an Airbus or Boeing. And it can be acquired at an affordable cost when you consider the safety benefits. Acquire and use this portable technology!! Get that instrument rating! Remember, weather is the number one accident factor. And the number one cause of weather related fatal accidents is continued VFR flight into IMC conditions. You may never plan on flying in instrument conditions, but having the skills to safely extricate yourself from an inadvertent IMC penetration can save your bacon. You can do all of this . . . or you can continue subjecting yourself and passengers to a 100 times greater flight risk than an airline flight. The numbers don't lie!
Click HERE to view what other readers have had to say about "Over the Airwaves."
Over the Airwaves
is not intended to be your typical training,
official news, or club-type social journal.
Instead, its intent is to stimulate thought,
enhance aviation critical thinking skills, to
encourage the strong pilot, and to disturb the
weaker pilot. With this breadth of scope,
Over the Airwaves will evoke a number of
reactions. Please feel free to share these
reactions with me by clicking
HERE.
Past Issues of
Click
HERE
to open any previous issue(s) of Over
the Airwaves and to search for any past articles.
|
So
what do we do? Do we change the rules?
Do we ignore some of the rules in the name of
perceived safety? If so, which rules do we
ignore? 
Here
is the problem. If flight instructors start
going down the road of saying that some FARs are to
be obeyed while others are less important, where do
we draw the line? It's sort of like allowing
the camel to get his nose inside the tent door.
Once that happens, the tent could soon be filled
with camel.
Sound
easy? It isn't!
This
final maneuver is reserved for only those who
have become truly proficient thus far in this
exercise. This time the pilot "kisses" the
runway first with the left main gear wheel, then
the right wheel alternatively along the runway.
My good friend and pilot mentor, Louie Nalbone,
DPE from Dunkirk, NY calls this the
"Turkey Trot." 
ructor
Max Trescott.
In
what is rapidly becoming a much publicized
accident, we're coming to appreciate the
complications of using a non-IFR certified GPS
to back up the traditional "steam gauges" when
on an instrument approach. This accident
also reminds of several safety tips that every
pilot should know when flying an instrument
approach to a non-towered airport.
In
the likely event that you found the instrument rating a
challenging learning experience, image how Stephen Hopson felt.
He is one of only 73 deaf pilots. He is now the ONLY deaf
instrument rated pilot!!
We
can do it in automobiles, why not in airplanes? That's
what a Cessna 182 pilot apparently thought last week when he
struck power lines and died while talking on his cell phone.
According to the NTSB preliminary report, that's exactly what
the pilot was doing . . . at night, no less!
Several
members of an AOPA chat forum got themselves in a snit while
reading an article titled,
Training
standards for general aviation pilots are set forth by the FAA.
Basically, before receiving their private pilot certificate,
every pilot must receive between 35 and 40 hours of flight
training and be able to demonstrate basic proficiency in a
series of maneuvers published in the Practical Test Standards
(PTS). Once done, all we require is a one hour flight and
one hour ground review with any CFI every two years.
Except for pilots who were involved in an accident or violation,
no further training or recertification is ever required.
But
what about you??
Whether
you are just starting out or you are a veteran pilot GA pilot,
begin by sitting down with the very best, most qualified and
experienced flight instructor (CFI) you can find. Good
instructors can be found in established flight schools or among
independent flight instructors in your community. 
Plan
to undergo aggressive recurrent training every year. This
training may be as simple as a three hour in-flight
maneuvers-based workout. Or it could be the pursuit and
acquisition of a new pilot rating or endorsement. Whatever
it is, plan to spend time sitting beside a qualified and
experienced CFI every year who methodically challenges and
upgrades your pilot skill-set.
Include
a regular dose of aviation reading each week. There are at
least a dozen aviation periodicals that are well worth your time
to study. And don't forget to review NTSB accident
reports. These reports contain a wealth of "what not to
do" information.
Sign
Up for "Over the Airwaves" 
